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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are more than eighteen million public employees in the 
United States.1  In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
characterized public employees into dual roles—citizen and 
employee.2  When public employees speak within the context of 
their employment, their speech is not constitutionally protected, 
even in cases where the expression addresses a critical issue 
relevant to the public.  Only when public employees speak as 
private citizens is their speech entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.  Though many public employees enter the public sector 
with the sole intention of serving their country, the latest Supreme 
Court decision on this issue conveys a slightly contrary message: 
public employees do not serve the public, they serve the United 
States government. 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,3 the Court ruled that public employees 
are not entitled to First Amendment protection for statements they 
make relating to their jobs.4  The impact of the Garcetti ruling 
forces public employees who expose government misconduct to 
rely on the federal and state statutory protections offered to 
government whistleblowers.  Yet the inadequacy of these 
protections is illustrated clearly by the facts in Garcetti: a county 
prosecutor who informed his supervisor that a high-level public 
official may have lied in an ongoing police investigation faced 
retaliation for exposing this conduct, and he had no legal redress.5  
Sound strange?  It is true. 
While in recent years Congress and the American public have 
 
 1. The actual figure is 18,644,112 according to the December, 2005, U.S. 
CENSUS REPORT.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND 
PAYROLL, http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/05fedfun.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL, http://ftp2.census.gov/ 
govs/apes/05stlus.txt. 
 2. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1962. 
 5. Id. at 1955–56. 
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been calling for increased protections for employees who speak out 
about government wrongdoing,6 the Garcetti Court made a marked 
move in the opposite direction.  First, this note traces the evolution 
of public-employee free speech rights, including a discussion of the 
most salient cases preceding Garcetti.7  Second, it reviews the facts, 
holding, and reasoning of the Appellate Court decision in Garcetti, 
and moves to the majority and dissenting viewpoints of the 
Supreme Court on review.8  Next, it maintains that the reasoning 
employed by the majority in Garcetti departs from the Court’s 
analysis in previous modern public-employee free speech cases.9  
The note then argues that the Garcetti ruling runs contrary to the 
interests of all relevant stakeholders—the employer, the employee, 
and the public.10  The note concludes by arguing that federal and 
state whistleblower protections must be enhanced to provide 
adequate protections to public employees.11 
II. HISTORY 
A. Rights of Public Employees Prior to 1967 
For much of the twentieth century, it was well-settled that the 
government, as an employer, could restrict the free speech rights of 
its employees.12  The constitutional analysis of public-employee free 
speech was known as the rights-privilege doctrine: government 
employment was a privilege and those fortunate enough to receive 
such employment had to tolerate certain limitations on their rights 
 
 6. Press Release, Carl Levin, United States Senator, The Federal Employees 
Protection of Disclosures Act (June 10, 2003), available at http://levin.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/release.cfm?id=216635 (“Whistleblowers play a crucial role in ensuring 
that Congress and the public are aware of serious cases of waste, fraud, and 
mismanagement in government.  Whistleblowing is never more important than 
when our national security is at stake.”). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220–21, 29 N.E. 517, 
518 (1892) (holding that the government could impose reasonable restrictions on 
its employees as a condition of employment); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing 
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010–11 (2005) (“[T]he thrust of 
the Supreme Court’s public employee speech jurisprudence was easy to discern      
. . . . If you wanted to make sure you kept your job, your best bet was to button 
your lip.”). 
3
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to speak freely.13 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the 
government’s responsibility for maintaining an efficient public 
service and, to that end, deferred to a government officer’s 
judgment to impose restrictions on public employees’ freedoms.14  
In 1947, the Supreme Court cited with approval the reasoning of 
Justice (then Judge) Oliver Wendell Holmes, that “[t]he petitioner 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman,”15 making it clear that the 
government can discipline a public employee for statements that, 
had they been spoken by a private citizen, would have enjoyed 
constitutional protection.  In so doing, the Court accepted the 
argument that public employment was not a right or entitlement, 
but rather, a privilege that could be subject to restrictions.16 
In 1952, in Adler v. Board of Education of New York,17 the United 
States Supreme Court again affirmed its ruling that public 
employees were subject to reasonable restrictions.18  In Adler, 
several public school teachers brought suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg law, a sedition law enacted 
to implement and enforce two earlier laws that made the utterance 
of certain statements or membership in subversive organizations 
adequate grounds for dismissal.19  The Adler Court declined to 
overturn the law and held that the authorities had not only the 
right, but also the duty, to maintain the integrity of the public 
 
 13. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (discrediting the 
rights-privilege doctrine as gratuitously dividing between right and non-right). 
 14. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947). 
 15. Id. (quoting McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517). 
 16. See id. at 99–104; Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in 
the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987). 
 17. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
 18. Id. at 492. 
 19. Id. at 486–90.  The pertinent parts of the laws are as follows: “A person 
employed as superintendent of schools, teacher or employee in the public schools, 
in any city or school district of the state, shall be removed from such position for 
the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any 
treasonable or seditious act or acts while holding such position.”  N.Y. EDUC. LAW  
§ 3021 (McKinney 2001).  The second law makes persons seeking public 
employment ineligible for such employment if they themselves advocate the 
overthrow of the government by force or illicit means or are in any way related to 
an organization that advocates a government takeover by force or illegal means.  
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105(1) (McKinney 1999).  The statute made clear that 
membership in the Communist party constituted prima facie evidence of 
ineligibility.  Id. § 105(1)(c). 
4
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schools.  The Court also said that no constitutional principles were 
violated by inquiring into the reputation and the associations of 
current and prospective employees to determine their fitness for 
employment and loyalty to the State.20  The Court opined that it 
was “clear that . . . persons have the right under our law to 
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will,” but that they do 
not retain these same rights when they work for the State.21  By this, 
the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that public employment 
was a privilege,22 and that First Amendment rights of public 
employees were not absolute. 
Yet Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Adler23 expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Court’s handling of public-employee 
jurisprudence, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Court’s 
opinion on the issue began to change.  In a series of opinions,24 the 
Court foreshadowed its pivotal 1967 decision in Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents,25 where it rejected the rights-privilege doctrine and 
overruled Adler entirely.26  In Keyishian, several university professors 
 
 20. Adler, 342 U.S. at 493. 
 21. Id. at 492. 
 22. Id. 
 23. I  have  not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citizen who 
enters the public service can be forced to sacrifice his civil rights.  I 
cannot for example find in our constitutional scheme the power of a 
state to place its employees in the category of second-class citizens by 
denying them freedom of thought and expression.  The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our 
society.  All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher.   
Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 24. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963) (holding that the 
state cannot withhold government benefits because an employee refused to 
comply with an employment regulation that conflicted with her religious beliefs).  
“It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may 
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”  
Id. at 404.  See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897 (1961) 
(acknowledging constitutional restraints on the government in dealing with its 
employees and recognizing that the federal and state government could not deny 
employment for “arbitrary or discriminatory” reasons such as membership in a 
particular political party); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) 
(pronouncing unconstitutional a state’s requirement that its officers proclaim a 
belief in the existence of God); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190–91 
(1952) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute that required employees to swear 
oaths of loyalty to the state as a condition of employment). 
 25. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 26. Id. at 605–06 (stating that “the theory that public employment which may 
be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how 
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected” (adopting the lower court’s language) 
and “constitutional doctrine which has emerged since [the Adler] decision has 
5
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again challenged the constitutionality of New York’s Feinberg law 
after being terminated for refusing to sign the Feinberg certificate 
saying that each was not a Communist.27  The Court stated that 
“[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to 
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow 
specificity” and held that public employment could not be 
conditioned on the surrender of constitutional rights.28  The Court 
also recognized that placing unreasonable restrictions on public 
employees was not compatible with the First Amendment 
guarantees of free speech.29  Yet the Supreme Court’s abolition of 
the rights-privilege doctrine left a void in First Amendment 
jurisprudence:30 what exactly was the extent of public employees’ 
First Amendment rights?  The Court answered this question just 
one year later when it decided Pickering v. Board of Education.31 
B. The Pickering Doctrine 
With the landmark ruling in Pickering v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court began to draw substantive boundaries on the free 
speech rights of public employees.32  Public school teacher Marvin 
Pickering was terminated after sending a letter to the local 
newspaper criticizing the school board and the district 
superintendent for their handling of a bond issue proposal.33  At 
Pickering’s dismissal hearing, the Board alleged that Pickering’s 
statements were inaccurate, harmful to the reputation of the 
Board, and controversial within the school district.34 
The lower courts rejected Pickering’s claim on grounds that it 
had already been rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court.35  
 
rejected its major premise.  That premise was that public employment . . . may be 
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be 
abridged by direct government action.”).  See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 13. 
 27. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592. 
 28. Id. at 604–06. 
 29. See id.; Stephen Allred, Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech 
Rights of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 434 (1984). 
 30. See Massaro, supra note 16, at 11. 
 31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 32. See generally id. at 573–75 (examining the respective interests before 
setting forth the balancing test). 
 33. Id. at 565–66. 
 34. Id. at 566–67. 
 35. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1967).  The lower courts 
essentially reverted back to the rights-privilege doctrine and asserted that “[b]y 
choosing to teach in the public schools, [Pickering] undertook the obligation to 
6
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But on review, the Supreme Court again made clear that it was 
unconstitutional to compel public employees to completely 
relinquish their free speech rights as a condition of employment.36  
The Court recognized the competing interests: on the one hand sat 
the intrusion upon public employees’ constitutional guarantee of 
free speech, and on the other hand sat the State’s interest in 
limiting its employees’ free speech rights to effectively serve the 
citizenry.37 
The decision resulted in what became known as the “Pickering 
balancing test”—an approach designed to weigh the relative 
employee and employer interests.38  The Court recognized the 
“enormous variety of fact situations” in which teachers or other 
public employees might speak critically of their employers, 
resulting in their termination.39  As a result, it declined to articulate 
a “general standard” that could be used to judge the employees’ 
statements.40  But the Court did provide some guidelines for lower 
courts to consider in determining whether a public employee’s 
speech was constitutionally protected.41  The guidelines included 
the following factors: the parties’ working relationship, the 
potential for creating disharmony among co-workers, the 
likelihood for disrupting normal work operations, and the need for 
confidence and loyalty.42 
The Court also considered the value to the general public of 
robust and uninhibited debate on matters of public concern, 
particularly the value of Pickering’s opinion, given his position as a 
teacher in the district.43 
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community 
most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to 
 
refrain from conduct which in the absence of such position he would have an 
undoubted right to engage in.”  Id. at 6.  The lower court went so far as to liken 
the termination of a public employee for exercising his or her free speech right to 
the termination on the basis of incompetence, malice, negligence, immorality, or 
other illicit conduct.  Id. 
 36. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 37. “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”  Id. 
 38. Id. at 563. 
 39. Id. at 569. 
 40. Id. at 568. 
 41. Id. at 569–73. 
 42. Id. at 571, 573. 
 43. Id. at 571–72. 
7
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how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should 
be spent.  Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to 
speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal.44 
The Court concluded that Pickering’s right to speak out and 
contribute to public discourse as any other member of the 
community might do outweighed the school administration’s 
interests in restricting its teachers’ speech.45  The Court in Pickering 
thus created a new doctrine whereby an individual employed in the 
public sector did not sacrifice his or her First Amendment rights 
merely by virtue of public employment.  Rather, the Court held 
that proper approach was to strike a balance between the interests 
of all the parties—employer, employee, and the public.46 
C. Post-Pickering to Connick v. Myers47 
Over the next fifteen years, the Supreme Court heard several 
cases regarding the rights of public employees;48 its decisions in 
these cases also marked an expansion of their First Amendment 
rights.  In 1972, the Court heard Perry v. Sindermann,49 in which a 
junior college professor alleged retaliation for speaking critically of 
the Board of Regents’ stance on a particular school policy.50  Citing 
Pickering, the Court concluded that Perry’s public criticism of the 
 
 44. Id. at 572. 
 45. Id. at 573. 
 46. The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1739 
(1984) (stating the Supreme Court has recognized that the interests of at least 
three parties—the employer, the employee, and the public—are relevant to the 
process of determining the constitutional rights of public employees.). 
 47. 461 U.S. 139 (1983). 
 48. This note does not include an examination of the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134 (1974).  In Roth, the court did not address the employee’s First 
Amendment right, but rather framed the issue as whether Roth had a 
constitutional right to receive a hearing and statement of reasons regarding the 
college’s decision not to re-hire him.  In Arnett, the sole issue was whether the 
plaintiff was denied due process upon termination under the standards 
established by the Lloyd-La Follette Act.  But to the extent that these opinions 
include statements which are helpful in understanding the Court’s attitude toward 
public-employee free speech rights, the cases may be cited. 
 49. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 50. Sindermann was elected President of the Texas Junior College Teacher’s 
Association.  Id. at 594.  In this role, he spoke publicly against the Board’s 
opposition to a proposal that would elevate the college to four-year status.  Id. at 
595.  The Board refused to renew his employment contract on the basis that he 
had acted insubordinately.  Id. at 594–96. 
8
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Board was constitutionally protected, and it precluded his 
termination on that basis.51 
In 1977, a teacher brought suit against his school district 
employer, alleging that the district violated his free speech rights 
when it denied his tenure in retaliation for certain untoward 
actions.52  The Court ruled that if the teacher was successful in 
proving his speech was principally responsible for the employer’s 
decision, then the burden shifted to the employer to prove it would 
have taken the same action, the employee’s speech 
notwithstanding.53 
Finally, in 1979 in yet another case involving a teacher’s 
termination, Bessie Givhan brought suit against the school district 
that fired her after she complained to the principal about the 
school’s racially discriminatory policies.54  The Supreme Court, 
again citing Pickering, reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision55 and held that public employees do not forfeit their First 
Amendment rights if they choose to convey their concerns in 
private, rather than in public.56 
D. Connick v. Myers: The Two-Tiered Test 
For more than a decade, the Pickering balancing test remained 
relatively unaltered.  But in 1983, the Supreme Court issued a 
ruling that significantly narrowed the rights of public employees, 
tipping the “balance” in favor of public employers.57  Sheila Myers, 
 
 51. Id. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
 52. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).  
The events preceding the adverse employment action against Doyle included 
getting into a fight with another teacher, and with the school’s cafeteria workers, 
referring to students as “sons of bitches,” making an obscene gesture towards 
other students, and sending an internal memorandum with information on 
teacher dress and appearance to a local radio station.  Id. at 281–82. 
 53. Id. at 287. 
 54. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411–13 (1979).  The 
school district argued that Givhan was terminated, in part, for being “arrogant” 
and “unreasonable” in conversations with the principal, for being disruptive, and 
for giving white students’ papers lower grades.  Id. at 412 n.2.  But the district 
court concluded that the main reason the school did not renew Ms. Givhan’s 
employment was because of her criticism of the school’s policies and practices.  Id. 
at 412. 
 55. Id. at 413–14. 
 56. Id. at 414–16. 
 57. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139 (1983); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee 
Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to 
Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 122–23 (1996) (explaining 
9
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an Assistant District County Attorney in New Orleans, drafted and 
circulated a questionnaire to her colleagues which sought 
information about the work environment, including one question 
pertaining to whether employees felt pressured to participate in 
political campaigns.58  In response, Myers was terminated for 
insubordination.59  She brought suit alleging that the termination 
violated her First Amendment rights.60 
The Connick Court acknowledged the danger in thwarting 
public employees’ free speech rights,61 but asserted that the 
Pickering Court’s emphasis on “the right[s] of a public employee ‘as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,’ was not 
accidental”62 and reflects the “common-sense realization that 
government offices could not function if every employment 
decision became a constitutional matter.”63 
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the 
historical development of public employees’ First Amendment 
rights, coupled with the government’s interest in promoting an 
efficient public service, compelled the conclusion that if the 
employee’s speech does not constitute speech on a matter of public 
concern, judicial review is unnecessary.64  By so stating, the Court 
erected an initial threshold inquiry regarding the public 
employee’s speech in question before proceeding to Pickering 
balancing test.65  To determine whether a statement constituted a 
matter of public concern, the Court explained that the “content, 
form, and context” should be considered.66  Citing with approval a 
 
that the law has recently evolved to ensure free speech by public employees only 
when the speech touches upon a matter of public concern); see also Clifford P. 
Hooker, Commentary, Balancing Free Expression and Government Interests: Connick v. 
Myers, 15 W. EDUC. L. REP. 633, 633-34 (1984) (stating that “Connick is the only 
recent Supreme Court opinion to uphold a government employer’s act of 
terminating an employee because of her criticism of her supervisors”). 
 58. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140–41. 
 59. Id. at 141. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 144–45 (“[T]he precedents in which Pickering is rooted . . . sought to 
suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs.  The issue 
was whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of 
discharge from joining political parties and other associations that certain public 
officials might find ‘subversive.’”). 
 62. Id. at 143. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 146. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 147. 
10
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previous opinion by Justice Powell, the majority reiterated: 
[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide 
discretion and control over the management of its 
personnel and internal affairs.  This includes the 
prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders 
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch.  Prolonged 
retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory 
employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the 
work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the 
efficiency of an office or agency.67 
Accordingly, the Court afforded “a wide degree of deference 
to the employer’s judgment” to assist the government in effectively 
carrying out its responsibilities.68  In light of this, the Court 
concluded that Myers’ survey constituted an employee grievance, 
even though one of the survey questions addressed a matter of 
public concern.69  Thus, her termination did not infringe upon her 
First Amendment rights.70 
While the dissent sharply criticized the majority’s ultimate 
holding,71 it did not expressly reject the majority’s ruling on the 
threshold inquiry.72  Thus, Connick refined the Pickering balancing 
test by concluding that, as an initial inquiry, it must be determined 
whether the public employee’s speech is related to a matter of 
public concern.73  If not, the employee’s speech is not 
constitutionally protected.74  If so, only then should the Pickering 
balancing test of competing interests become relevant.75 
 
 67. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, 
J., concurring)). 
 68. Id. at 150–52. 
 69. Id. at 149. 
 70. Id. at 154. 
 71. Justice Brennan authored the dissenting opinion in which Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.  Id. at 156.  He differed with the majority 
in three respects.  First, he argued that by using the context factor to determine 
whether the employee’s statement relates to a matter of public concern and then 
using it again to establish whether the speech negatively impacted the employer, 
the majority alters the balancing by weighing that factor twice, rather than once.  
Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Next, he asserted that Myers’ survey was on a 
matter of public concern.  Id. at 163.  Finally, he argued that extreme deference to 
the government employer is not desirable when assessing the impact of a public 
employee’s critical speech.  Id. at 168. 
 72. See id. at 156 (majority opinion). 
 73. Id. at 146. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
11
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E. Post-Connick 
Since Connick, the Supreme Court has remained faithful to the 
framework of Pickering and Connick.76  In Rankin v. McPherson,77 the 
Court had its first opportunity to apply the Pickering/Connick 
combination.  In that case, McPherson was fired for making a 
statement unrelated to any aspect of her job.78  The Court held that 
statements unrelated to an employee’s job duties warranted the 
Pickering balancing test, so long as the statement addressed a matter 
of public concern.79  The Rankin Court’s reasoning closely followed 
the analysis set forth in Connick; that is, it examined the “content, 
form, and context” factors of McPherson’s speech to answer the 
threshold public concern question.80  It concluded that her 
statement did, in fact, address a matter of public concern, and 
proceeded to weigh the relevant factors, whether McPherson’s 
speech: impaired the government’s ability to effectively perform its 
necessary functions, interfered with the normal operations of the 
agency, created disharmony in the work environment, negatively 
impacted McPherson’s work performance or job responsibilities, or 
made it difficult for her superiors to effectively discipline her.81  
The Court resolved the balancing test in McPherson’s favor and 
held that her First Amendment rights prevailed over the 
government’s interests.82 
In Waters v. Churchill,83 the Court framed the issue as whether it 
should apply the Connick test to what it believed a public 
employee’s speech to be, or whether the trier of fact should discern 
what the speech actually was before proceeding to the Connick 
threshold inquiry followed by Pickering balancing test.84  In a 
plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that a public employer 
 
 76. Kozel, supra note 12, at 1017. 
 77. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 78. Id. at 381–82.  McPherson held an administrative position in a law 
enforcement office.  Id. at 380–81.  After hearing on the radio that an assassination 
attempt had been made on President Reagan, she offhandedly told her colleague 
and boyfriend, “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”  Id. at 381. 
 79. Id. at 386–87. 
 80. Id. at 384–85. 
 81. Id. at 388. 
 82. Id. at 392. 
 83. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 84. Id. at 664, 668.  In Waters, a public hospital terminated Churchill after 
hearing that she made critical comments about her supervisor.  Id. at 666.  
Churchill disputed that the conversation took place as the hospital alleged.  Id. at   
666–67. 
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could terminate an employee based on what the employee 
supposedly said, so long as the employer’s belief was reasonable.85  
By so ruling, the Court precluded the factfinder from hearing 
evidence and deciding for itself what was said, thus again narrowing 
public employees’ free speech rights. 
And in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,86 the 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of a congressional enactment 
that prohibited federal employees from accepting honoraria for 
making an appearance, giving a speech, or writing an article.87  The 
government argued the ban should be upheld because of the 
possibility of workplace disruption and because of the potential 
decline in its operational efficiency.88  But citing the valuable 
contributions made by public employees, coupled with the public’s 
right to be informed of such views,89 the Court imposed a heavier 
burden on the government to prove the ban was necessary.90  The 
government could meet that burden,91 and as a result, the Court 
ruled that the ban was unenforceable.92 
Before Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court’s most recent decision 
involving public-employee free speech came in City of San Diego v. 
John Roe.93  In that case, Roe, a police officer, sold videotapes over 
the Internet which portrayed him engaging in sexually explicit acts 
while wearing his police uniform.94  After being fired, he sued, 
alleging the termination violated his free speech rights.95  The 
Supreme Court employed the conventional Pickering/Connick 
analysis and considered its holdings in two previous invasion of 
 
 85. Id. at 677–80. 
 86. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 87. Id. at 458. 
 88. Id. at 470. 
 89. Id.  “The large-scale disincentive to Government employees’ expression 
also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear what the 
employees would otherwise have written and said.”  Id. (referencing Va. Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976)).  
“We have no way to measure the true cost of that burden, but we cannot ignore 
the risk that it might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or Hawthorne.”  
Id. 
 90. The Court justified this additional burden by reasoning that its previous 
decisions in public-employee free speech cases involved just one employee, 
whereas the statute in question applied to thousands of public employees’ 
expressions.  Id. at 466–68. 
 91. Id. at 479. 
 92. Id. at 480. 
 93. 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
 94. Id. at 78. 
 95. Id. at 79. 
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privacy cases96 to establish whether Roe’s speech regarded a matter 
of public concern.97  Without difficulty, the Court resolved the 
threshold public concern inquiry against Roe, and did not even 
reach the Pickering balancing test; as a result, the case was 
dismissed.98 
F.  Summary of Legal History 
The Court’s early jurisprudence regarding the free speech 
rights of public employees underwent a dramatic change beginning 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  The Court’s landmark ruling in Pickering v. 
Board of Education laid the groundwork for the expansion of public 
employees’ free speech rights, subject to a balancing test that 
accommodated the government’s dual roles of sovereign and 
employer.99  These roles impose conflicting responsibilities: on the 
one hand, the government, as sovereign, is obliged to its 
constituents to uphold their ability to engage in free and open 
debate, the essence of the First Amendment; on the other hand, 
the government, as employer, must provide its citizens with public 
services, and the practical realities associated with carrying out 
these functions justify some boundaries on public employees’ free 
speech rights.100 
This balancing test remained in place until the early 1980s, 
when Connick v. Myers refined the test to eliminate First 
Amendment protection for speech of a purely personal nature.101  
The Connick decision narrowed the instances in which public 
employees’ speech would be protected and perhaps marked a new 
pro-employer era characterized by affording great deference to the 
government’s role as employer and its corresponding duties. 
The Court’s rulings in Rankin, National Treasury Employees 
Union, Waters, and Roe did not disturb the Pickering/Connick line of 
reasoning.  But the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether a 
public employee’s speech within the scope of his or her 
 
 96. Id. at 83–84 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) and 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (stating that “public concern is 
something that is . . . of legitimate news interest [or] of general interest . . . to the 
public”)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 84–85. 
 99. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 100. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994); Lewis v. Cohen, 165 
F.3d 154, 161 (2d. Cir. 1999). 
 101. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139 (1983). 
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employment received First Amendment protection.  Would the 
Court preserve the Pickering calculus, or would the Court opt for 
another rule?  The circuit courts were split on this issue, but the 
Supreme Court resolved the disagreement in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 
III.   GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS 
A. Facts of the Case 
Richard Ceballos was employed as a Deputy District Attorney 
in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office.102  In 2000, he 
was contacted by a defense attorney regarding People v. Cuskey, a 
case being prosecuted by the District Attorney’s office.103  The 
defense attorney believed there were inaccuracies in the affidavit of 
a deputy sheriff who obtained a search warrant crucial to the 
prosecution’s case.104  The defense attorney notified Ceballos that 
he planned to challenge the warrant, and asked Ceballos to review 
the case, a customary aspect of Ceballos’s job.105 
Ceballos visited the location described in the affidavit and 
determined there were serious discrepancies between what 
Ceballos had seen and the statements the deputy sheriff made in 
order to obtain the search warrant.106  Particularly alarming to 
Ceballos was the fact that the deputy sheriff had called a “long 
driveway” what Ceballos deemed to be an entirely separate 
roadway, and the fact that the deputy sheriff had described tire 
tracks at the crime scene, but Ceballos concluded that the street’s 
composition made it nearly impossible for tire tracks to have 
remained visible.107 
Ceballos spoke with his immediate supervisors, Carol Najera 
and Frank Sundstedt, about his investigation and all agreed that 
the search warrant may have been improperly obtained.108  Ceballos 
wrote a memorandum to his supervisors outlining his findings and 
recommended that the case be dismissed.109  On March 9, 2000, 
 
 102. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006). 
 103. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951. 
 104. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. 
 109. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955–56. 
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Ceballos, Najera, Sundstedt, representatives from the Sheriff’s 
office, and another deputy district attorney met to discuss the 
situation.110  The meeting was apparently quite intense, and one 
lieutenant criticized Ceballos about the way he had handled the 
matter.111 
Instead of heeding Ceballos’s recommendation to dismiss the 
case, Sundstedt believed it prudent to wait until the court ruled on 
the motion challenging the warrant.112  After informing the defense 
attorney that Ceballos believed the deputy sheriff had lied to obtain 
the warrant, Ceballos was subpoenaed to testify for the defense.113  
Ceballos informed Najera that, pursuant to his obligation under 
Brady v. Maryland,114 he had no choice but to provide the defense 
with a copy of his memo regarding the investigation.115  At the 
hearing, the prosecution objected to numerous questions by the 
defense attorney.116  The judge sustained these objections, and 
therefore, Ceballos was not allowed to reveal his opinion on the 
legality of the warrant.117  The judge denied the defendant’s motion 
and the prosecution continued with its case.118  Because he testified 
on behalf of the defense, Ceballos was not permitted to remain a 
part of the prosecution’s team for this particular case.119 
After these events, Ceballos maintained that Garcetti, the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney, Najera, and Sundstedt retaliated 
against him for writing the memo regarding the deputy sheriff’s 
ostensible misconduct, for notifying the defense counsel about his 
investigation, and for testifying at the motion hearing.120  Ceballos 
asserted that the retaliatory actions included a demotion, a transfer 
to a less desirable office,121 and hostile treatment from his 
 
 110. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. 
 111. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 112. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 115. The duties to which Ceballos referred were delineated in Brady.  See id. 
(holding that the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favoring the accused is a 
violation of due process where the evidence may be relevant in determining either 
guilt or punishment). 
 116. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.   
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. In 2001, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky conducted an independent study 
of the Los Angeles Police Department, specifically regarding the Rampart scandal, 
in which police officers attempted to convict innocent civilians on criminal 
16
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immediate supervisors.122 
Ceballos filed an employment grievance, but this was denied 
for lack of evidence that he had experienced any retaliation.123  He 
then brought suit in the district court, asserting that the adverse 
employment action constituted a violation of his First Amendment 
rights.124  The county moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
its decisions regarding Ceballos’s employment were made to 
accommodate its staffing demands, and, moreover, Ceballos’s 
memo did not necessitate First Amendment protection because it 
was made in the normal course of his employment.125  The district 
court ruled in favor of the county on the basis of qualified 
immunity and Ceballos appealed.126 
B. The Appellate Court’s Decision 
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals followed closely 
the reasoning set forth in the Pickering/Connick line of cases: “To 
determine whether Ceballos’s speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, we apply a two-step test that stems from the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of 
Education . . . .”127  The test is, of course, to first determine whether 
Ceballos’s speech was related to a matter of public concern, and, if 
it was, to weigh the relative interests required by the Pickering 
balancing test. 
In determining whether Ceballos’s speech addressed a matter 
of public concern, the majority viewed the crucial factor as whether 
the employee’s intent in speaking was to draw attention to 
wrongdoing, or rather to gain ammunition on a wholly personal 
matter.128  If the former, then the next step was to engage in the 
 
charges by planting evidence and committing perjury.  His report observed that 
transferring police officers to other assignments, typically far away from where the 
officers lived, was a relatively common practice to punish disloyal police officers.  
The officers referred to this practice as “freeway therapy.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, An 
Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the 
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 549 (2001) (analyzing the Board of 
Inquiry’s report and setting forth conclusions and recommendations).  Ceballos 
describes his transfer as such an act.  Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1172, 1172 n.2. 
 122. Ceballos, 361 F.3d  at 1171–72. 
 123. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173. 
 128. Id. at 1174 (quoting Roth v. Veteran’s Admin. of United States, 856 F.2d 
17
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Pickering calculus, and if the latter, then the speech was not worthy 
of First Amendment protection.  The majority easily resolved this 
issue in Ceballos’s favor for two reasons: first, it stated that when 
public employees make statements relating to “corruption, 
wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency . . . their 
speech is inherently a matter of public concern;”129 and second, the 
county itself did not contend that Ceballos’s statements related to a 
purely personal matter.130 
The defendants argued that Ceballos should not receive First 
Amendment protection because his statements were made 
pursuant to his employment responsibilities.131  In his concurring 
opinion, Judge O’Scannlain said that the pertinent consideration 
under Connick was not whether the speech in question addressed a 
matter of public concern, but whether the person spoke as a citizen 
or as an employee.132  Under this reasoning, the speaker’s role is 
dispositive in the analysis of whether the speech is protected.  To 
support his argument, Judge O’Scannlain cited numerous federal 
circuit court cases in which the citizen-employee distinction was 
discussed,133 but he conceded that Connick did not explicitly 
mention this point.134 
Judge O’Scannlain offered three reasons for adopting a broad 
rule excepting all job-related speech from First Amendment 
protection.  First, he believed that public employees’ speech while 
on the job belonged to the State with no corresponding interest in 
 
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1174, 1193 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring). 
 132. Id. at 1187. 
 133. Id. at 1187–88 (citing Gonzalez v. City of Chi., 239 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 
2001) (declining to establish a broad rule exempting job-related speech from First 
Amendment protection but holding that, absent “a unique set of facts[,]” public 
employees’ speech while performing routine job-related duties lack First 
Amendment protection); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (adopting a per se rule that public employees’ speech related to their 
employment does not receive First Amendment protection); Buazard v. Meridith, 
172 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a public employees’ “purely job-
related” speech does not receive First Amendment protection)). 
 134. See id. at 1187. 
  Connick   did  not  fully  rationalize  the  distinction  it  drew  between 
speech offered  by a public employee acting as an employee carrying out 
his or her ordinary job duties and that spoken by an employee acting as a 
citizen expressing his or her personal views on disputed matters of public 
import.   
Id. 
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the speech itself by the public employee, except in doing a good 
job.135  Second, he reiterated Connick’s concern that the judiciary is 
not the proper forum to resolve each and every employee grievance 
lamenting that “with . . . Ceballos on the books, what federal or 
state employment-based decision can possibly evade intrusive 
federal constitutional review?”136  Finally, he noted that legislatures 
had enacted whistleblower statutes to afford legal protections to 
public employees who expose government wrongdoing, and thus 
judicial protections were both misguided and redundant.137 
The majority expressly rejected Judge O’Scannlain’s proposal 
to fashion a per se rule that would exempt job-related speech of 
public employees from First Amendment protection.138  First, the 
court reasoned that public employees are well-positioned to speak 
on matters of public concern and, as a result, declining to offer 
them First Amendment protection for reporting government 
misconduct would diminish the public’s ability to maintain the 
integrity of government operations.139  Second, the majority 
attacked the claim that public employees have no personal stake in 
their speech and recognized that for many public servants, their 
jobs mean much more than just a paycheck, but also reflect a desire 
to advance the public good.140  Next, they noted the absurdity of 
denying public employees protection for exposing wrongdoing to 
their supervisors, but granting them protection if they choose to 
circumvent the established channels and go directly to the 
public.141  Finally, the majority surveyed the other circuit court 
rulings on the matter and found ample support for its view that 
public employee job-related speech remains subject to the two-
tiered Pickering/Connick test.142 
 
 135. Id. at 1189. 
 136. Id. at 1190. 
 137. “This case [exemplifies] the too-common tendency of well-intentioned 
jurists to squeeze a policy-oriented square peg into a round constitutional hole       
. . . . With such Platonic Guardians, who needs elected representatives at all?”  Id. 
at 1192–93. 
 138. Id. at 1175. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 1175 n.5. 
 141. Id. at 1176. 
 142. Id. at 1176–77 (citing Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a hospital employee’s memo on patient care is protected speech 
despite the employee’s role as director of quality management and stating as 
“incorrect” the proposition that an employee’s statement in the course of his or 
her job duties is never protected); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 644–45 (6th Cir. 
2003) (holding that a police officer’s report on police brutality addresses a matter 
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Having resolved that issue in Ceballos’s favor, the majority 
moved on to perform the Pickering balancing test.143  It found no 
significant interest on the part of the county worthy of 
protection,144 and therefore held Ceballos’s speech to be protected 
under the First Amendment.145 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The issue before the Court was whether public employees’ job-
related statements were entitled to First Amendment protection.146  
In a 5–4 ruling, the majority promulgated Judge O’Scannlain’s view 
that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official employment responsibilities, their speech is not protected 
by the First Amendment.147 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Kennedy began the opinion by asserting that for many 
years, the “unchallenged dogma”148 was the rights/privilege 
doctrine, but that this doctrine had been qualified by the Pickering 
Court to provide protection of certain statements for two reasons.  
First, the majority acknowledged that public employees should not 
forfeit all their First Amendment rights simply because they 
accepted government employment.149  And second, the majority 
recognized the societal benefits of hearing the well-informed 
 
of public concern and stating that the notion that an employee spoke pursuant to 
his or her job responsibilities is a relevant factor, but not the determinative 
factor); Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (permitting constitutional 
protection for a police officer’s statements in a memo to his supervisors and 
expressly rejecting a per se rule that would exempt statements made pursuant to 
job-related duties from First Amendment protection);  Baldassare v. New Jersey, 
250 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that an investigator’s speech about the 
potential misconduct of other employees constituted protected speech 
notwithstanding that his role as an investigator involved disclosing such 
behavior)). 
 143. Id. at 1180. 
 144. “[B]ecause the defendants have failed even to suggest disruption or 
inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney’s Office, there is little for us to 
weigh in favor of the individual defendants under Pickering.”  Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 1960. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer filed dissenting 
opinions. Id. at 1962–76. 
 148. Id. at 1957 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
 149. Id. at 1957, 1958. 
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opinions of public employees regarding public issues.150  But the 
majority downplayed Pickering’s importance in employee-speech 
jurisprudence and referred to that Court’s decision as a “starting 
point” in the analysis.151  The majority understood its predecessor’s 
primary purpose as affording public employers the necessary 
control over their employees so as not to impair its public service 
mission.152  The majority also believed that the premise 
underscoring its decisions in previous public-employee free speech 
cases was to allow public employees free speech rights with respect 
to public debate rather than to job-related activities.153  It asserted 
that “[r]efusing to recognize First Amendment claims based on 
government employees’ work product does not prevent them from 
participating in public debate.  The employees retain the prospect 
of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic 
discourse.”154 
Relying on these principles, the majority stated that the 
dispositive factor was that Ceballos’s statements were made 
pursuant to his job duties.155  They argued that Ceballos was not 
speaking as a citizen when he complained about the deputy 
sheriff’s conduct, but rather as an employee of the government.156  
The majority reasoned that, because Ceballos was a government 
employee, it was irrelevant whether he had some personal interest 
in speaking out against the deputy sheriff; the crucial point was that 
the government has the right to limit what its employees say while 
they are serving in their official government capacity.157  The 
majority drew a sharp distinction between Ceballos as citizen and 
Ceballos as government employee.  As a citizen, Ceballos had the 
same First Amendment rights as a member of the general public.  
But as a government employee, Ceballos did not have the right to 
 
 150. Id. at 1958–59. 
 151. Id. at 1957. 
 152. See id. at 1958. “The Court’s overarching objectives, though, are     
evident. . . . Government employers, like private employers, need a significant 
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would 
be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”  Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1960. 
 155. Id. at 1959–60.  “The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his 
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”  Id.  The 
Court later says, “The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to 
Ceballos’ official duties.”  Id. at 1960. 
 156. Id. at 1959–60. 
 157. Id. at 1960. 
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do as he pleased; rather, the majority held that the government, as 
employer, can control its employees’ job-related expressions 
without infringing on their right to free speech.158  The majority 
believed that its ruling sufficiently preserved public employees’ 
First Amendment rights while also accommodating the 
government’s interest in effectively managing its work environment 
in order to perform critical government functions.159 
The majority also appeared quite concerned with the prospect 
of every disgruntled employee seeking judicial review of an adverse 
employment decision.160  To eliminate this potential problem, it 
held that the Pickering balancing test is activated only when the 
speech in question is uttered by the public employee, as a citizen, 
and not when the speech falls within the scope of the employee’s 
job responsibilities.161 
While the majority recognized the need to expose 
governmental ineffectiveness and transgressions by its officers, it 
seemed content to leave that task to the sensible judgment of the 
government itself and the whistleblower statutes available to 
government employees who report misconduct.162 
2. The Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Souter’s dissent began by concurring with the 
majority’s stated interest in effectively serving the citizenry, thus 
disallowing public employees from making inflammatory or 
inciting statements about their employers.163  But he asserted that 
on balance, the employee’s interest in expressing his or her 
opinion about the government’s misconduct, and the public’s 
interest in hearing his views, overshadowed the government’s 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 1961 (“Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court 
of Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and 
intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business.”  Id. at 1962.  “Our precedents do not support the existence of a 
constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in 
the course of doing his or her job.”  Id.). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1962. 
 163. See id. at 1963–64  (Souter, J., dissenting).  “The reason that protection of 
employee speech is qualified is that it can distract co-workers and supervisors from 
their tasks at hand and thwart the implementation of legitimate policy . . . .”  Id. at 
1964. 
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efficiency interests.164 
Justice Souter noted that in two previous cases, the statements 
that led to the employees’ termination were related to the 
employees’ job duties, and the Pickering balancing test was deemed 
appropriate.165  He observed that in Givhan and Madison, the Court 
did not draw a distinction between the individual as citizen and the 
individual as employee; quite the reverse, the Court recognized 
that the two are often united.166 
Justice Souter identified several incongruities in the majority’s 
ruling.  First, contrary to the majority’s opinion, he contended that 
the need to engage in the Pickering balancing test of interests was 
arguably more important when employees made statements related 
to their job duties because of the benefits to both the individual 
and the public from that speech, and also because the employees 
are speaking on matters that they understand best.167  Next, he 
called it “odd” that the majority’s ruling would deny protection to a 
school human resources officer who criticized a principal’s 
unwillingness to hire minorities, whereas a teacher or secretary 
would be protected when making the same complaint.168  Second, 
he argued it was even “stranger” to refuse to protect an employee 
who utilized the chain of command to voice his or her concerns 
about potential violations, but afford protection to that same 
employee if he chose to take the matter directly to the public.169  
Finally, he believed that the majority incorrectly differentiated 
between the individual as a citizen and the individual as an 
employee, and observed that the best public servants are those who 
do not make a distinction between their civic lives and their 
professional lives, but rather, merge the two together.170 
Justice Souter reiterated his concurrence with the majority on 
an important point: that the government requires “civility . . . 
 
 164. Id. at 1963–64. 
 165. Id. at 1964 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 
(1979) (following Pickering when the district fired a teacher for complaining about 
employee racial composition) and Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8, v. Wis. 
Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (stating that Pickering should 
be followed when a teacher spoke out on his on behalf at a school board 
meeting)). 
 166. Id.  “[A] public employee can wear a citizen’s hat when speaking on 
subjects closely tied to the employee’s own job . . . .”  Id. at 1964. 
 167. Id. at 1965. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1965 n.1. 
 170. Id. at 1965–66. 
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consistency . . . honesty and competence” in its workforce.171  But 
he criticized the majority’s response to the government’s needs as a 
“winner-take-all” approach, and argued that this tactic was not 
justified.172  He believed the better approach would be to adopt an 
even higher threshold for evaluating whether expressions made 
pursuant to job responsibilities are protected.173  He outlined a new 
threshold inquiry: a public employee who speaks pursuant to his 
job responsibilities would only receive First Amendment protection 
when “he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies 
high standards of responsibility in the way he does it.”174 
Justice Souter then attacked the majority’s rationale that 
whistleblower statutes would sufficiently shield employees from 
retaliatory action.175  He argued that the whistleblower laws provide 
varying degrees of protection based on locality, and that the 
Federal Circuit has interpreted the legislative enactments with 
respect to federal employees as denying protection for statements 
made in the course of one’s job responsibilities.176  Therefore, he 
contended, the laws relied on by the majority to protect employees 
like Ceballos would not offer sufficient protection.177 
Finally, Justice Souter conveyed his dismay that the breadth of 
the majority’s ruling could imperil academic freedom by 
threatening college professors who inexorably make statements 
and write articles as part and parcel of their employment.178  In 
response to this concern, Justice Kennedy asserted that academic 
freedom issues raised additional constitutional considerations that 
do not fall within the purview of the Court’s public-employee free 
speech cases; thus the Court passed on deciding whether the 
Garcetti ruling applied to such cases.179 
Justices Stevens and Breyer each wrote separate dissenting 
opinions.  Both disagreed with the majority’s categorical rule.  
Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority’s rule instructs public 
employees who wish to receive First Amendment protection to go 
 
 171. Id. at 1967. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1970. 
 176. Id. at 1970–71. 
 177. Id. at 1971. 
 178. Id. at 1969–70. 
 179. Id. at 1962. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/8
13. HARRIS - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:05:51 PM 
2007] SILENCING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 1167 
directly to the public rather than to their supervisors.180  He 
believed this to be an unacceptable implication.181  Justice Breyer 
further added that lawyers’ professional obligations require them 
to speak out under certain circumstances, and where that is the 
case, the government’s interest in prohibiting that speech is 
weakened.182 
IV.   THE PROBLEM 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti provided guidance to 
the lower courts that when a public employee brings a suit alleging 
that an adverse employment action violated his or her First 
Amendment rights, the claim should be automatically discarded if 
the speech for which the employee was terminated was made in the 
course of the employee’s duties, notwithstanding the importance of 
the statement to the general public.183  Garcetti effectively 
eliminated the public concern threshold test and the Pickering 
balancing test for employment-related speech, a significant 
doctrinal development.  In laying down this absolute rule, the 
majority offered three principal reasons.  First, the government has 
the right to control its employees’ speech;184 second, public 
employees have no personal stake in their job-related 
expressions;185 and third, the fact that employees receive 
whistleblower protection for exposing government misconduct 
renders further judicial protection unnecessary.186  Finally, while 
not explicitly stated in the majority’s opinion, the rhetoric of the 
majority appears to evince a latent concern with the potential for 
increased litigation.187  The ramifications of the Court’s decision 
are alarming for several reasons. 
A. The Government’s Interest 
Throughout its history, the Court has ascribed different values 
to different kinds of expression.  Speech concerning public issues 
has historically received the strongest constitutional protection, 
 
 180. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1974–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
   183.    Id. at 1960. 
 184. Id. at 1959–60. 
 185. Id. at 1960. 
 186. Id. at 1962. 
 187. See id. at 1961. 
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while speech relating to personal matters has not received such 
expansive safeguards.188  In Garcetti, the government argued, and 
the majority agreed, that First Amendment protection for public 
employees’ job-related expressions is unwarranted, and to conclude 
otherwise would undermine the government’s ability to effectively 
manage its workforce and operate efficiently.189  The ability of the 
government to exert greater control over its employees’ speech 
than over the speech of its citizenry has not been thoroughly 
examined by the courts, but it has been generally accepted as 
necessary in order for the government to perform its multitudinous 
tasks.190 
To assess the cogency of this argument, one must recall the 
historical rationale behind the ruling that certain restrictions on 
public employees’ speech were permissible.  These limitations had 
their roots in the notion that the government must have full 
authority to carry out its mandate to effectively serve the citizenry.  
In order to fulfill this mandate, the Court has permitted the 
government, as employer, to impose qualified limitations on the 
free speech rights of public employees.191 
In many respects, this makes sense.  A public employee who 
brazenly speaks out against his colleagues or supervisors can 
undermine the government’s effectiveness.  The government 
employer should be able to discipline or even terminate a 
troublesome employee without fearing the consequences.  Few 
would argue that the government cannot take action against an 
employee for offensive, indecent, or treacherous behavior.  To 
 
 188. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) 
(“[E]xpression on public issues has ‘always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 
467 (1980)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (“The public 
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance—
the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—is so          
great . . . .”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating “debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (noting “speech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government”), with Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1984) (stating “if [the expression] cannot be fairly 
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is 
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”).  See also R. 
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 
28–29 (1987). 
 189. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 190. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994). 
 191. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1968). 
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hold otherwise might undermine government efficiency due to 
resources that would necessarily be consumed in managing an 
unruly employee and the diversion this would create from carrying 
out the government’s important duties.  Moreover, the separation 
of powers between the executive and judicial branches requires 
that the judiciary not micro-manage the government’s affairs.192 
But efficiency is not the sole objective of a governmental 
system, and the value of protecting constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms should not be underestimated.  The law should work to 
provide an environment in which the government can function 
effectively, while simultaneously guaranteeing the protection of 
individual and collective liberties and rights.  As recognized in 
Pickering and its progeny, the interest in efficiency must at times 
give way to the interest in preserving a fundamental liberty. 
Indeed, a strong argument exists that providing public 
employees First Amendment protection will enhance the 
government’s effectiveness.  The Supreme Court long ago 
recognized that “informed public opinion is the most potent of all 
restraints upon misgovernment . . . .”193  Human experience teaches 
that those who expect their actions to be subject to subsequent 
examination may well proceed with greater caution.  Under this 
supposition, when government workers are aware that their actions 
may be subject to public scrutiny, they will labor more effectively.  
When public employees are functioning at their best, the 
government, in turn, will benefit.  Permitting government agencies 
to shield themselves from scrutiny by allowing them to clamp down 
on the free speech rights of their employees deprives the citizenry 
of a useful mechanism of monitoring the government and can lead 
to an unchecked and mismanaged system of public service.  
Providing the public with information on the government’s affairs 
sends a clear message that the actions of government employees 
are not beyond public scrutiny. 
Without such information, the public is denied the 
opportunity to assess whether its government is operating 
effectively.  Unlike private companies, the government does not 
 
 192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (stating that when public employees’ speech is 
unrelated to a matter of public concern, the judiciary should not intrude on the 
government’s duties in the name of the First Amendment, and also asserting that 
ordinary dismissals from government service, while perhaps unfair, are not subject 
to judicial review even in those situations where the dismissal may be improper or 
unreasonable). 
 193. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). 
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have indicia such as stock prices, dividends, or rankings to gauge its 
performance, or specific shareholders to whom it is accountable—
the government’s shareholders are the members of the public.  
Encouraging public employees to speak out against improper 
behavior can drive out inefficiencies that might otherwise plague 
an unmonitored government.  Discouraging public employees 
from commenting on unethical practices will make it more difficult 
for government officers to understand where the problems lie, 
thereby impeding progress towards a better-functioning 
government. 
As Justice Stevens commented in his dissent, the majority’s 
ruling creates a perverse incentive for employees who notice 
wrongdoing to take these concerns to the media or directly to the 
public.194  Such a disclosure might subsequently create a public 
relations havoc for the government, forcing it to consume far more 
resources than if it had been initially responsive to the employee’s 
allegation. 
As previously alluded to, there is a direct correlation between 
the public’s perception of information disclosure and the public’s 
trust in its government.  A government shrouded in secrecy will 
confirm suspicions that the government cannot be trusted,195 and 
undermine the notion that government exists for the people’s 
benefit.  A transparent government, on the other hand, conveys 
legitimacy and helps to maintain public confidence in the system.196  
Insofar as the government promotes policies that foster 
transparency, the result will yield an increase in the public’s faith in 
the system.  The upshot of a confident body politic is increased 
participation, robust economic development, and an orderly 
society that complies with the rule of law.197 
B. The Public’s Interest 
Central to the Court’s rulings in Pickering and Connick was the 
 
 194. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 195. William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice 
Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 1069, 1091 (1999) (“Many people do not trust governments, in general, or their 
own governments, in particular.  Whatever they hear from governments is    
suspect . . . .”). 
 196. See id. at 1091–92 (discussing transparency in government as being 
essential for the public’s trust). 
 197. See id at 1096–99. 
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interest of the public; specifically, the value to society of hearing 
the government employee’s views.198  The Court asserted that 
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is 
the essence of self-government.”199 
In fact, the Court’s decision to permit certain free speech 
rights was grounded in the belief that public employees may be in 
the best position to have informed opinions about government 
operations, to understand how the government can operate more 
effectively, and to observe and report misconduct.200  Public 
reception of such information leads to a more informed citizenry 
that is better equipped to make knowledgeable decisions about its 
government.201  Yet Garcetti instructs that government employees 
receive the least protection when they are speaking on subjects that 
they know best. The Garcetti holding, then, compared with that in 
Rankin, creates a contradiction. It is debatable whether the average 
person would be concerned about a given public employee’s 
attitude toward the president.202  It seems more likely that the 
public would be interested in hearing the public employee’s views 
on abusive practices in the system. 
This public benefit factor is virtually ignored by the Garcetti 
majority.203  A review of the lower court decisions in public-
employee free speech cases reveals that the content of the speaker’s 
expression has been the determinative factor in deciding whether 
the speech is protected.  Recall the Connick court’s formulation: 
 
 198. The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, supra note 46, at 1739. 
 199. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
 200. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134, 228 (1974); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968). 
 201. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1016 (2005) (“[T]he First Amendment allows open discussion 
and criticism of governmental policies and practices and thereby creates the 
conditions enabling an informed and critical electorate.  In other words, coupled 
with the right to vote, the First Amendment provides a means by which the 
citizenry can ‘check’ and ultimately direct governmental power.”). 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81.  See also Cynthia K. Y. Lee, 
Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 
76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1988). 
 203. While the majority did make mention of the benefits to the public from 
hearing the opinions of government employees, it essentially discounted this 
factor by ruling that the speaker’s role, citizen or employee, was dispositive.  If the 
speaker’s expressions were made pursuant to his or her employment, the majority 
apparently believed the value to the public of that expression to be irrelevant; 
rather, the majority concluded that a public employer has complete “control over 
what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 
S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). 
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where the employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern, 
and more specifically, where the expression “bring[s] to light 
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the 
part of [a government official],”204 that speech should be protected, 
in large part because of its benefit to the public.205  But according 
to Garcetti, even speech on crucial public issues is not protected; 
rather, the role of the speaker is the determinative factor.  
Retroactively applying the Garcetti rule to earlier lower court cases 
illustrates the certain loss of valuable information, such as reports 
regarding police brutality and misconduct in public schools.206 
To understand why such information is virtually guaranteed to 
be suppressed, consider the importance of employment to 
individuals and families.  Post-Garcetti, public employees who 
choose to speak critically will likely suffer reprisal, thereby 
jeopardizing their well-being and the well-being of their families.  
Rather than risk these consequences, many employees will simply 
keep quiet in the face of wrongdoing.  The eventual result could be 
a culture of silence in the government workplace where 
misconduct goes unreported.  Public employees may turn a blind 
eye to wrongdoing and those employees responsible for monitoring 
and reporting workplace concerns may refrain from making critical 
 
 204. 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
 205. See id.  The Connick Court decided that Myers’s survey did not constitute a 
matter of public concern, and based this decision on the fact that if it were 
released to the public, it would not convey any information of value to the public; 
see also Lee, supra note 201, at 1134 (“[F]ree expression and specifically public 
employee speech are so valuable to society that courts should ensure their 
protection . . . .”). 
 206. In Taylor v. Keith, two police officers, pursuant to an internal investigation 
and within the scope of their employment duties, were retaliated against after 
expressing concern over the brutal conduct of a fellow police officer toward a 
citizen.  338 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2003).  The Sixth Circuit held the officers’ 
statements were entitled to First Amendment protection.  Id. at 641.  In Canary v. 
Osborn, the Appellate Court rejected a public employer’s summary judgment 
motion where an assistant principal was demoted for revealing a conspiracy among 
school administrators to cheat on student achievement tests.  211 F.3d 324 (6th 
Cir. 2000).  In another case involving the statements of a police officer, the 
plaintiff was reassigned to a lower position after refusing to comply with a directive 
to include statements which he knew to be false in an official police report and 
subsequently attempting to bring to light exculpatory evidence in a case that the 
district attorney was prosecuting.  Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
1998).  In each of these cases, the protected speech was made in the course of the 
speaker’s employment.  But under the new Garcetti ruling, such statements would 
not receive protection.  Therefore, police officers who report brutality or rogue 
behavior, or teachers or school administrators who report misconduct on the job, 
will not receive protection for speaking out. 
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comments, even though this is exactly what their job requires. 
Public employees, whose salaries are paid with taxpayer 
dollars, should be accountable primarily to the citizens they serve, 
and only secondarily to their employer.  As such, public employees 
should have not only the right, but also the duty to report fraud, 
waste, and abusive behavior, because unless an employee discloses 
wrongdoing, these practices may go undetected.  Encouraging 
public employees to make early disclosures of misconduct can help 
to curb abuse before it becomes unmanageable, thereby providing 
a tangible benefit to taxpayers. 
Thus, there are two reasons favoring policies that protect the 
free speech rights of public employees. First, a reduction in these 
rights corresponds to a decrease in information that would 
otherwise be available to citizens.  Second, maintaining free speech 
rights provides the possibility of early detection of government 
wrongdoing which serves the public interest by minimizing the 
detrimental impact.  Threatening public employees with retaliatory 
employment action is contrary to both of these interests. 
C. The Individual’s Interests 
The government’s argument, with which the majority agrees—
that the individual’s interest is irrelevant—is highly problematic.  
Its distinction between an actor as a citizen and an actor as an 
employee207 is unfounded.  To begin with, the underlying values of 
the First Amendment—“self-fulfillment, the advancement of 
knowledge and the discovery of truth, and preservation of an 
informed electorate”208—are the same irrespective of whether the 
actor is speaking as an employee or as a citizen.209  Even the 
government acknowledges the dual benefits of serving as a public 
employee: an exciting career coupled with the opportunity to make 
a difference for the nation.210 
 
 207. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959–61. 
 208. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of 
Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government 
Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 709–10 (1984). 
 209. Id. 
 210. USAJobs is the official site of federal employee job listings for the U.S. 
Government.  The site includes the following phrases: “Make a difference in the 
lives of the American public” and “Being a civil servant is a demanding, yet 
rewarding, job.” USAJobs, Working for America, http://www.usajobs.gov/first 
timers.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).  
For the Federal Government to be efficient and effective, it needs the 
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Assume for a moment that the majority’s argument is correct 
and that Ceballos “did not act as a citizen” when he performed his 
job, but rather merely as a disinterested employee who was simply 
carrying out orders. This creates the impression that public 
employees are essentially puppets under the control of their 
employers.  Yet the numerous examples of government employees 
refusing to obey the inappropriate directives of their superiors 
proves that government employees play more than just the role of 
“employee” as public servants.211 
Another factor—the pay differential between employees in the 
public and private sectors—rebuts the presumption that there is no 
aspect of self-gratification that commands First Amendment 
protection.212  “Individuals do not shed their personal identities on 
the job”213 nor should we promote a rule that encourages them to 
do so.  It is in society’s best interest to unite the actor as citizen and 
as employee so that the upstanding values the citizen brings to his 
or her job are not stifled. 
D. Are Whistleblower Protections Adequate? 
The majority justified its holding by stating that the “powerful 
 
best and the brightest employees who want to serve their fellow 
countrymen and who are willing to share their knowledge, their skills, 
and their energy for the betterment of our nation.  The contributions 
Federal employees make today, tomorrow, and in the future guarantee 
that America will remain the world leader and can successfully respond 
to the foreign and domestic challenges of the 21st century. . . .  And then 
there’s the satisfaction that comes from knowing that you are making a 
difference.  
USAJobs, Working for America, http://www.usajobs.gov/working.asp (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2006). 
 211. Consider the following examples: David Hackworth was a decorated 
Vietnam War veteran who returned to the United States after four tours of duty.  
He spoke out against the Vietnam War, alerting the public that the war could not 
be won.  His superiors moved to court-martial him, but he eventually resigned with 
an honorable discharge.  Douglas Martin, David H. Hackworth—Colonel in Vietnam, 
Columnist, S. F. CHRON., May 7, 2005, at B5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/07/BAG78CLMMH1.DTL.  Coleen Rowley, a 
career FBI agent, wrote a memo to the head of the FBI that criticized the FBI’s 
culture and asserted that the FBI missed a crucial opportunity to discover the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks before they took place.  James Kuhnhenn, FBI 
‘Careerists’ Stalled Terror Case, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 7, 2002, at A1. 
 212. Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, State Employee Pay Growth Below 
Inflation Rate for Third Straight Year (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.aft.org/ 
presscenter/releases/2006/090406.htm. 
 213. Cheh, supra note 208, at 710. 
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network of legislative enactments” at the local, state, and federal 
levels provides sufficient protection to whistleblowers.214  There are 
certain statutory protections for government whistleblowers, such 
as the Civil Service Reform Act, enacted by Congress in 1978 to 
protect federal employees.215  Then in 1989, Congress passed the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, which intended to augment the 
previous legislation and afford protection for federal employees 
who assist in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality, and 
corruption.216  But a recent report by the Congressional Research 
Service admits that “[e]nacting statutory rights for whistleblowers    
. . . have not produced the protections that some expected. . . . 
[T]he agencies created by Congress to safeguard the rights of 
whistleblowers [] have not in many cases provided the anticipated 
protections to federal employees.”217 
Current case law creates an extremely high bar for employees 
to overcome before they can succeed on a whistleblower claim.  
The courts have placed the burden squarely on the employee by 
asserting that there is a “presumption that public officers perform 
their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with 
the law and governing regulations”218 and that this presumption can 
only be contradicted with “irrefragable proof.”219  Furthermore, the 
Federal Circuit’s220 recent decisions have denied whistleblower 
protections to employees who complained directly to their 
supervisors.221  In Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management,222 the 
Federal Circuit already ruled that whistleblower protections do not 
protect public employees whose disclosures of potential 
 
 214. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006). 
 215. Cong. Research Serv. Report for Cong., National Security Whistleblowers 
2, http://www.pogo.org/m/gp/gp-crs-nsw-12302005.pdf (Dec. 30, 2005) 
[hereinafter CRS Report]. 
 216. Id. at 20. 
 217. Id. at 2. 
 218. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 219. Id. 
 220. The Federal Circuit is one of the three agencies responsible for 
adjudicating whistleblower claims.  The other two are the Merit Systems Protection 
Board and the Office of Special Counsel.  CRS Report, supra note 215, at 2. 
 221. Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that an 
employee’s disclosure of potential unethical practices to his supervisors is not 
protected by whistleblower statutes); Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (denying whistleblower protection to a public employee who 
complained directly to the alleged wrongdoer). 
 222. 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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misconduct are made in the course of their employment duties.223 
As a county employee, Ceballos was not eligible for federal 
whistleblower protection, but he may have relied on California’s 
whistleblower statute to shield him from retaliation.  But Ceballos 
was not eligible for whistleblower protection under the state statute 
because, at the time of his actions, the state law required that the 
disclosure be made to an external public body such as the media.224  
Ceballos instead sought First Amendment protection that was 
subsequently denied by the Court, in part because it erroneously 
believed he could still avail himself of the state’s whistleblower 
protection.225  The Garcetti case, thus, makes federal and state 
whistleblower protections even more important, since the 
employee is no longer entitled to First Amendment protection—
particularly for communications made internally and in the course 
and scope of an employee’s authority. 
But the statutory protections are not uniform,226 and public 
employees may receive different treatment depending on their 
place of residence and their level of government employment.  The 
current statutory enactments are inadequate and superficial, and 
the judicial protections are no better. Thus, while the majority may 
believe that whistleblower statutes afford public employees ample 
protection, the reality belies this argument.  This begs the question: 
prior to Garcetti, public employees have spoken critically in the 
course of their employment responsibilities with nothing other 
than whistleblower protections (which clearly are limited and 
arguably arbitrary)—will Garcetti even have an impact then? 
The answer to this is twofold. First, any abridgment on an 
individual’s free speech rights must be adequately justified.  The 
Constitution guarantees free speech protections, but the courts 
have imposed certain reasonable restrictions on the First 
Amendment rights of public employees to promote government 
efficiency.  That much seems to be reasonable.  Regardless of its 
actual impact, the ruling sends a message that the government, as 
 
 223. Id. at 1353–54. 
 224. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (2003). 
 225. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006). 
 226. What Price Free Speech: Whistleblowers and the Garcetti v. Ceballos Decision  
Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 261 (2006) (statement of 
Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whisteblowers Center), available at http:// 
whistleblowers.org/Ceballos.final.testimony.pdf (examining the whistleblower 
statutes in all fifty states and concluding that the “powerful network” referred to by 
the Garcetti majority simply does not exist).  Id. at 5–6. 
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an employer, can retaliate against its employees who do not agree 
with its message.  Surely, this contention is not consistent with the 
principles of democracy upon which this country was founded. 
Second, it is likely that public employees are aware of 
whistleblower protections generally, but perhaps not aware of their 
specific characteristics.  Public employees, confronted with a grave 
situation and desiring to act honorably, may make a disclosure 
presuming that they will somehow be protected, either 
constitutionally or by statute.  Before Garcetti, if the whistleblower 
did not realize that he or she did not qualify for statutory 
protection, the employee could always file suit alleging a 
constitutional violation.  Others might have been aware of the 
vagaries in the laws, but may not have been willing to test their 
boundaries.  But the Garcetti ruling leaves no room for ambiguity: 
absent statutory protections, public employees’ job-related 
statements receive no protection.  Public employees who may have 
previously come forward will no longer be likely to do so. 
E. An Issue Left Unanswered: The Impact on Academics 
In his dissent, Justice Souter expressed concern over the 
breadth of the Garcetti ruling, particularly the potential impact on 
college professors.227  He observed that the Court has invariably 
held that the writings and speeches of academics occupy a unique 
position in the constitutional landscape and as such, have enjoyed 
expansive First Amendment freedoms.228  The majority responded 
that the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment 
rights of university professors involved considerations beyond that 
of cases related to public employees.229 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the free speech 
doctrine and academics has not been clearly defined by the 
Supreme Court.230  Add to this uncertainty the fact that the Garcetti 
appellate court’s special concurrence by Judge O’Scannlain 
(adopted by the Garcetti Supreme Court majority) 231 relied heavily 
 
 227. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1969–70 (2006) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1962 (majority opinion). 
 230. Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 17, 18 
(2005) (“Courts need an effective doctrinal framework for adjudicating [academic 
freedom] disputes.  They do not have one.”). 
 231. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1187-88, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) 
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on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Urofsky v. Gilmore,232 in which 
the plaintiffs were six professors employed by various collegiate-
level schools throughout Virginia.233  That case involved a challenge 
to the constitutionality of a Virginia statute restricting all state 
employees from accessing sexually explicit materials on the state’s 
computers.234  The professors objected to the statute on grounds 
that their compliance with it necessarily infringed their academic 
freedom rights and thus their ability to perform their employment 
duties.235  While the Fourth Circuit recognized the importance of 
academic freedom to the American democracy, it maintained that 
the distinction between the individual’s First Amendment rights as 
a citizen as compared to that of an employee was nonetheless 
relevant.236 
Now that the Garcetti Court has validated this distinction with 
regard to public-employee speech, the next step may well be to 
extend this analysis to the speech of academics.  With regard to 
university professors, this distinction is again problematic because 
the scope of what constitutes employee speech versus citizen 
speech is not clear.  Teachers’ in-class statements might be 
considered within the scope of their employment, but the line is 
not so clear with regard to other aspects of many professors’ jobs, 
such as delivering lectures, publishing articles, and writing books.237 
Given the Garcetti majority’s deft ability to limit the application 
of the Pickering and Connick tests, the Court may be able to do it 
again.  Using Garcetti as its backdrop, the Court might begin such 
an inquiry at a similar starting point: whether college professors’ 
job-related statements are made pursuant to their roles as 
professors or their role as citizens.  The dichotomy drawn by the 
majority in Garcetti has potentially detrimental implications for 
academics.  As a result, this issue is worthy of close monitoring. 
 
(O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring), overruled by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 
1951 (2006). 
 232. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 233. Id. at 404. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 406, 410 n.9.  The plaintiffs maintained that the statute inhibited 
their ability to teach and research.  Id.  The complaint alleged numerous 
restrictions on the plaintiff’s job duties, including validating student research on 
teacher-assigned tasks, and conducting independent research.  Id. 
 236. See generally id. at 414 (rejecting academic freedom as a “right” and 
discussing the notion that, insofar as such rights are recognized, they are 
institutional rights as opposed to individual rights). 
 237. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 230. 
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F.  What Is Fair? 
Undoubtedly, a critical aspect of our legal system should be to 
promote fairness,238 both to serve the societal good, but also to 
preserve the public’s confidence in the judiciary.239  To that end, 
the legal system should advocate rules that are consistent with the 
public’s notions of fairness, particularly where there is likely some 
public consensus about what the rules should be. 
Given the choice between an open and accountable 
government on the one hand, and an opaque and sealed 
government on the other, most people would certainly choose the 
former.240  As one scholar noted: 
By any commonsense estimation, governmental 
transparency, defined broadly as a governing institution’s 
openness to the gaze of others, is clearly among the 
pantheon of great political virtues. A fundamental 
attribute of democracy, a norm of human rights, a tool to 
promote political and economic prosperity and to curb 
corruption, and a means to enable effective relations 
between nation states, transparency appears to provide 
such a remarkable array of benefits that no right-thinking 
politician, administrator, policy wonk, or academic could 
 
 238. For a detailed discussion on the notion of fairness in the legal system, see 
generally Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2002) 
(rejecting the suggestion that analysts of legal policy should rely exclusively on 
economic considerations in making decisions and must bear in mind societal 
notions of fairness). 
 239. The judicial branch has few means to execute its judgments.  As a result, 
the public’s opinion of judicial decisions, particularly with respect to whether the 
decisions are fair, is integral to the judiciary’s effective disposition.  As Justice 
Frankfurter once noted, “The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse 
nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction.”  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the Court should not decide a racial gerrymandering case because 
it was a political question); see also Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The 
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 59 n.171 (2002) (“An 
essential condition for an independent judiciary is public confidence. . . . Without 
public confidence the judiciary cannot operate . . . . [P]ublic confidence in the 
judiciary is the most precious asset that this branch of government has.  It is also 
one of the most precious assets of the nation.”). 
 240. Consider the alternative to an open and transparent government: “a 
government riddled with autocracy, corruption, or incompetence [in which] an 
open information policy would be unwelcome.”  Mock, supra note 195, at 1091; see 
also Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 898–99 (2006) 
(“[O]pen government produces an informed and interested public, and by 
implication . . . secrecy caused by opaque or closed government produces 
suspicious and/or ignorant masses.”). 
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be against it.241 
Indeed, the Framers’ aversion toward an abusive government 
was the driving force behind the Constitution as written.  Policies 
that encourage transparency in government would therefore be 
favored over policies that promote silence on the part of public 
servants. 
The Garcetti ruling cannot be squared with the principles 
underlying an open, accountable, and transparent government. By 
sanctioning the termination of employees who speak out, the 
ruling discourages employees from being candid in the workplace, 
thereby promoting silence and secrecy, ultimately creating a more 
centralized power structure.  Government secrecy diminishes its 
accountability to the public242 and an increased centralization of 
government power can lead to corruption and irresponsibility.243  
As one federal circuit judge eloquently noted, “[d]emocracies die 
behind closed doors . . . . When government begins closing doors, 
it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the 
people.  Selective information is misinformation.”244  Thus an open 
government is instrumental to maintaining a strong democracy, 
particularly with respect to unelected public officials, who are 
insulated from voter referendums; openness is essential in order to 
ensure accountability by government decision makers. 
After Garcetti, the picture is clear: the government is 
substantially insulated from liability for misconduct.  By permitting 
retaliation against employees who attempt to expose government 
wrongdoing and denying the public access to that information, the 
government has isolated itself from public inquiry.  Since the 
public would surely be in favor of rules that exposed corruption or 
immoral behavior in their government, it follows that a rule which 
tolerates retaliatory action against a civic-minded employee who 
speaks out for the public’s benefit does not comport with societal 
expectations of fairness.  Therefore, Garcetti is inconsistent with the 
 
 241. Mock, supra note 195 at 888–89.  The article also discusses the manifold 
benefits of transparency including as a predicate for effective representative 
government, permitting the free flow of information thereby allowing input, and 
examination and evaluation by the citizenry resulting in an increase in the quality 
of government.  Id. at 898–900. 
 242. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1115, 1125 (2002). 
 243. Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental 
Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (1995). 
 244. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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public’s welfare. 
G. Should the Court Have Used a Heightened Standard? 
Less than ten years ago, the Court in United States v. National 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) was deeply concerned about the 
impact of its ruling because of the thousands of employees that 
would be affected.245  The NTEU Court also featured prominently in 
its decision the public’s rights to receive the employee’s views.246  In 
that case, the Court maintained that the government would prevail 
only if it could demonstrate that its interests in operating an 
effective public service system outweighed the interests of both the 
prospective audiences and the current and future public 
employees’ interest in that expression.247  That much is familiar,248 
but the Court noted two additional considerations that gave rise to 
a modified standard favoring public employees: first, it asserted 
that because the ban had an impact on vast numbers of employees, 
the concerns were much more serious than the impact of a single 
employment decision; second, the Court observed that in contrast 
to a single employment action made in response to an employee’s 
statements, the ban was damaging because it had the potential to 
discourage employees from speaking in the future.249  It stated that 
prospective limitations on the speech of public employees weighed 
heavily “on the public’s right to read and hear what the employees 
would otherwise have written and said.”250  As a result, the Court 
imposed a much heavier burden on the government to prove the 
salutary nature of the ban.251 
While the NTEU court made it clear that its modified standard 
was not applicable in post hoc Pickering analysis cases,252 its 
positioning of the societal advantages of employees’ opinions 
suggests that additional weight should be afforded to the public 
interest factor when the employee’s speech provides information 
from which the public will benefit.253  Here, Ceballos’s statements 
 
 245. See 513 U.S. 454, 466–68, (1995). 
 246. Id. at 470.  See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. 
 247. 513 U.S. 454 at 468. 
 248. The test set forth in NTEU was essentially the Pickering balancing test. 
 249. Id. at 467–68. 
 250. Id. at 470. 
   251.    Id. at 468. 
 252. Id. at 467. 
 253. See id. at 467–68. 
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had the potential to supply the public with valuable information.  
Therefore, the Court should have considered the enormous 
potential loss of valuable information as well as the far-reaching 
consequences of an unqualified ruling.  Had the Court 
contemplated these implications, it might have reached a different 
result. 
But the Garcetti Court never publicly considered applying a 
heightened standard.  Surely the majority realized that its ruling 
was more than simply a judgment against Ceballos, but regarding 
all public employees.  Recognition of this factor would have at least 
assuaged the concerns of the millions of public employees affected 
and those of free speech advocates, that the Court appreciated the 
extent of its ruling, nevertheless, it reached the conclusion that the 
speech should not be protected.  But the breadth of its ruling is not 
contemplated in the majority’s opinion, and as such, the opinion 
lacks legitimacy. 
H. The Majority’s Concern Regarding Excessive Litigation Is Unjustified 
The majority appeared concerned that the uncertainty created 
by the balancing test would generate a large volume of claims by 
disgruntled employees.254  This concern is neither well-founded nor 
persuasive.  For almost forty years, the federal courts have operated 
under the Pickering constructs.  There is no evidence that the courts 
have been debilitated with such litigation.255  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court itself has rejected this same argument advanced by 
a notable defendant.256  “Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is 
terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with 
little if any personal involvement by the defendant . . . .  Moreover, 
the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to 
litigation . . . .”257 
In applying the new Garcetti rule, the lower courts must still 
determine whether the speech is a part of the speaker’s job or is 
 
 254. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). 
 255. Justice Souter’s response to the majority included a count of such claims: 
each year, there were approximately one hundred cases in the federal district 
courts, and seventy in the federal courts of appeal.  Id. at 1968 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 256. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (dismissing the President’s 
argument that disallowing him absolute immunity from civil liability would lead to 
an aggrandizement in the number of private lawsuits filed against the President). 
 257. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56). 
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outside the scope of his or her duties.258  This inquiry requires fact 
determinations and is no less onerous than the pre-Garcetti 
standard; therefore, this issue is likely to be a battleground in 
future cases. 
Additionally, the shame and embarrassment public employees 
confront after revealing misconduct is another factor that 
discourages them from stepping forward.259  As one legal scholar 
noted: “There is something in our culture that holds most of us 
back from blowing whistles and also from pursuing legal remedies 
even when we feel we are abused in an employment situation.”260  
For the aforementioned reasons, the majority’s concern that the 
judiciary will be deluged with litigation of public employees’ claims 
is unconvincing. 
Even Justice Souter argues that the standard in such disputes 
should be more stringent allowing only “matter[s] of unusual 
importance” to proceed.261  But in order to justify the adoption of a 
new standard after more than twenty-five years, the Court should 
ensure that the standard provides sufficient additional clarity.  
Generally, matters of public concern are inherently important.  
Whether they are unusually important would likely be difficult to 
ascertain at the initial stage; and in any case, the Pickering calculus 
dictates that the competing interests be measured, thus providing 
the opportunity for judicious balancing. Foreclosing the 
employee’s right to seek a legal remedy due to concerns that overly 
litigious employees will cripple government effectiveness is tenuous 
at best. 
I.   The Pickering/Connick Standard Should Not Have Been Abandoned 
It is beyond doubt that the government should be afforded a 
certain degree of discretion to manage its workforce.  Yet this need 
 
   258.    Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 259. In Professor Chemerinsky’s analysis of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, he observed that officers are discouraged from speaking out, but if 
an officer gets so frustrated that he or she decides to step forward, that officer is 
marked as a traitor and is subjected to retaliatory actions that are often overlooked 
by supervisors and colleagues.  Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 561–62; see also 
Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for 
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 359 (1991) (“[T]he world has not been 
kind to whistleblowers.  In fact, whistleblowers are hated, harassed and vilified.”). 
 260. John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
585, 589 (1992). 
 261. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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is not so compelling that it requires all future claims of workplace 
retaliation (for statements made pursuant to an employee’s job) to 
be barred, because on the other side of the scale lie substantial 
interests as well.  Every individual has a personal stake in his or her 
government and community.  Individuals who choose public sector 
employment often do so in order to make a positive impact on 
society.  After Garcetti, an employee who discovers wrongdoing in 
the workplace has two options: keep quiet or speak out and risk 
retaliation. 
The Court could have reached the same result in Garcetti by 
employing the Pickering balancing test.  Recall the factors that the 
Court considers on the employer’s side of the scale: the likelihood 
that the speech will undermine the agency’s operations, foster 
controversy among co-workers, or disrupt the workplace.262  The 
defendants need not prove that Ceballos’s memo actually disrupted 
the workplace, but merely that such potential existed.263  If this 
were the case, the Court could have upheld the county’s 
disciplinary action against Ceballos without laying down a 
categorical rule. 
Recognition of the government’s important interests is 
embodied in the Pickering and Connick tests; and the Court has 
erected other obstacles that proscribe many employer-employee 
disputes.264  Because these tests adequately accommodated the 
county’s needs, the Garcetti Court’s radical departure on a 
constitutional question of such paramount importance was not 
warranted. 
The Court’s judgment in Garcetti is a policy choice about the 
value of public-employee speech, but even more importantly, about 
the government’s inherent powers.  By portraying the absolute 
control over public-employee speech as necessary to operate 
 
 262. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571, 573 (1968). 
 263. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
 264. Under the Pickering/Connick test, the public employee must first prove 
that his or her speech is on a matter of public concern before the Court will 
perform the balancing of interests.  Id. at 146.  Even where the speech is deemed 
to address a matter of public concern, the court may determine that the statement 
is so disruptive of the government’s ability to operate that it cannot be protected.  
Id. at 151–52.  Moreover, lack of a causal connection may warrant the case’s 
dismissal.  Id. at 153–54.  And if the employer can prove it would have taken the 
adverse employment action despite the employee’s speech, then the speech is 
technically protected, but the case is dismissed because the status of the speech is 
no longer relevant.  Id.  In short, a public employee bringing a lawsuit alleging a 
violation of his or her First Amendment right must surmount numerous obstacles. 
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effectively, the Garcetti court and the government have, for the 
moment anyway, side-stepped the serious questions about whether 
this ruling serves the best interests of the individual employee, the 
public at large, and even the government itself. 
With the Garcetti decision, absent sufficient statutory 
protections, the government has virtually unlimited powers to 
terminate or demote employees for speaking critically in the 
workplace.  By the breadth of its scope, this ruling creates a chilling 
effect on employees and makes them less likely to expose 
government fraud, waste, or abuse, because of the risk of dismissal.  
As Justice Marshall once wrote, this danger “hangs over [public 
employees’] heads like a sword of Damocles, threatening them with 
dismissal for any speech that might impair the ‘efficiency of the 
service’ . . . . [F]or the value of a sword of Damocles is that it 
hangs—not that it drops.”265 
V. CONCLUSION 
The tension between the interests of the individual, the 
government, and the public has been the subject of a succession of 
public-employee free speech cases heard by the Supreme Court 
over the past forty years.  The Garcetti decision is not within the 
contemplation of existing precedent on such cases. 
The Court’s holding upsets a relatively sound balance and is 
imposed at the expense of not just Ceballos alone, but also future 
public employees who will be dissuaded from reporting 
misconduct.  While many public employees should be lauded for 
their courageous efforts to step forward and inform the public 
about their government’s affairs, these employees will now either 
refrain from doing so or be punished. 
To correct the majority’s ruling, Congress should introduce 
and pass legislation to close the loophole created by Garcetti and to 
provide statutory protections that the majority apparently believes 
already exist.266 
 
 265. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 266. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. 
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